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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between rm eciency and vertical inte-
gration in the Italian machine tool (MT) industry. A theoretical model of entry
and competition within an industry has been set up: in this model rms can choose
either to be vertically integrated or not: the most ecient rms self-select in being
vertically integrated, while less ecient rms prefer a disintegrated structure and
they both coexist in equilibrium. In the second part of the paper the relationship
between eciency and vertical integration has been tested using a stochastic frontier
framework in an novel panel dataset including around 500 MT builders. The theo-
retical prediction is conrmed: outsourcing seems a rational choice for less ecient
rms to make positive operating prots and stay in the market; on the other hand,
more ecient rms exploit their eciency advantage to control a greater part of
the production chain, possibly beneting from greater coordination among dierent
phases and tailored intermediate inputs.
Keywords: Vertical integration, technical eciency, rm heterogeneity, heteroskedas-
tic frontier model
JEL Classication: D24, L23, L25, L64
An earlier version of this paper previously circulated as \The Impact of Vertical Integration and
Outsourcing on Firm Eciency: Evidence from the Italian Machine Tool Industry", DISA Working
Papers 01, 2010. We would like to thank Davide Castellani, Chris Gilbert, Antonio Alvarez, Paolo
Polinori, the R.O.C.K. group at the University of Trento and participants to workshops in Pisa (EWEPA,
2009) and Lecce (IO workshop, 2009) for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
yCorresponding author PhD Candidate at Doctoral School in Economics and Management - CIFREM,
University of Trento and Research Assistant, University of Perugia; e-mail: fabio.pieri@unitn.it
zDipartimento di Informatica e Studi Aziendali, University of Trento; e-mail: en-
rico.zaninotto@unitn.it
11 Introduction
Empirical studies on productivity and eciency at the micro level have found large het-
erogeneity across rms or plants even within narrowly dened industries (see Bartelsman
and Doms, 2000; Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi, 2005; Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt,
2008; Dosi, Grazzi, Tomasi, and Zeli, 2010, among others). Dierences in performance
among production units have been mainly attributed to variations in management skills,
human capital, R&D and technological capital, product innovation, rm's international
exposure (exports and foreign direct investments), together with factors which are exter-
nal to the rm, like technological spillovers, the intra-industry degree of competition and
the regulatory environment (see Syverson, 2010, for an extensive review on the topic).
The control of vertical links of production, i.e. the decision about which phases of
production to keep inside to the rm (vertical integration) and which ones to leave to the
`outside', is another factor which is related to the rm productive performance: vertically
integrated structures can be either justied by the search for an optimal provision of
specic physical inputs in a production process1, or by a better supervision over each phase
of production (which stands for a better use of management as in Horta csu and Syverson,
2009); moreover, a backward integration may allow to avoid a double marginalization in
the market for inputs or may be a channel to rise up the costs of competitors, buying
the main part of essential input of a backward market2. Dierent degrees of vertical
integration are observable in all kinds of industries and across dierent countries and, in
the last decades, a tendency toward a disintegration of the production processes has been
extensively documented by researchers (see Feenstra, 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 2005,
among others) and the popular press. This phenomenon has generically fallen under the
name `outsourcing', and it has been justied by dierent motivations ranging from the
need for focusing on `core competences' to the raise of information technologies, which
have lowered transaction costs typical of fragmented organizations (Hitt, 1999; Baldwin,
2006).
Given the relevance of the phenomenon, the relationship between the vertical orga-
nization of production and productive eciency has generated an amount of empirical
research in the last years, but results are still not unambiguous. The wide collection of
cases presented by Berger (2006) illustrates vividly how rms can follow dierent outsourc-
ing strategies while getting similar protability. Heshmati (2003) oers a wide survey of
studies on the relationship between outsourcing and productive eciency, with particular
1This motivation has been mainly studied in the transaction costs and property rights literature
(Williamson, 1971; Grossman and Hart, 1986). See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for an up-to-date survey
on this eld of analysis.
2Of course, these are just few motivations supporting the vertical integration choice: see Perry (1989)
for an extensive discussion on this issue.
2reference to service outsourcing, from which not clear-cut patterns emerge. A similar
result of wide heterogeneity of outsourcing choices, and not clear patterns of its eects
on productivity emerges from the more recent survey proposed by Olsen (2006). More
recently, some slight evidence in favor of a negative impact of disintegration on produc-
tivity have been proposed, as in the study on German manufacturing rms by Broedner,
Kinkel, and Lay (2009), or by Federico (2010) whose study of Italian manufacturing rms
nds evidence of a productivity ordering where vertical integration is chosen by the most
productive rms while outsourcing is chosen by the least productive rms.
In this paper we study the relationship between rm eciency and vertical integration
in a representative sample of Italian machine tool (MT) builders. Given the debated
relationship, in order to come up with an empirical testable hypothesis we have set-up a
theoretical model (largely inspired by Antras and Helpman, 2004; Syverson, 2004) of entry
and competition within an industry in which rms can choose the vertical organization
of production, i.e. to be vertically integrated or not. The main prediction of the models
is that the most ecient rms self-select in being vertically integrated while less ecient
rms prefer a disintegrated structure and they both coexist in the market in equilibrium.
The coexistence of dierent organizational choices is made possible because rms trade
o organizational xed costs, which are higher in a vertical integrated structure, with
marginal costs of production which are higher in a disintegrated structure.
In the second part of the paper, drawing on this result, we have empirically tested the
relationship between eciency and vertical integration. The Italian MT industry seems
a natural candidate for this exercise: in fact, this industry is characterized by the coexis-
tence of dierent types of organizational forms (see Rolfo, 1998) and large heterogeneity
in productive eciency. A stochastic frontier framework has been adopted in order to
estimate the relationship between rm eciency and the level of vertical integration.
Using an novel panel dataset including around 500 MT builders, our empirical ndings
show that vertically integrated rms delineate the frontier technology, thus conrming
the theoretical prediction.
Overall, this work's main contributions regard a better understanding of the function-
ing of those industries |as the MT industry| which are characterized by dierences in
the productive performance among rms and wide heterogeneity in organizational choices,
and this has been done both setting up a proper theoretical framework and detailed em-
pirical analysis. From a methodological point of view, the use of a stochastic frontier
framework allows us to jointly estimate the parameters of the production function, the
level of eciency and the correlation between rm eciency and the degree of vertical
integration: this can be considered as an improvement to previous studies on the topic, in
which productive eciency scores (total factor productivity) have been usually regressed
on the covariate in a second step of the econometric analysis, raising several econometric
3problems related to the 2-step estimation3.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we give a general overview of the
industry under analysis; Section 3 illustrates the theoretical model from which the main
hypothesis is derived; Section 4 presents the choices adopted for the empirical evaluation;
Section 5 presents the data and Section 6 shows the results of our empirical analysis.
Section 7 discusses some issues and suggests steps for further research.
2 Industry overview
The MT industry gathers all the producers of metal working machines (and components),
which are capital goods that are used for manufacturing nal goods in other industries.
The main user of machine tools is the broader mechanical engineering industry (which
uses around 40% of the produced machines); the automotive industry and models and dies
industry are two other important clients. The three main productions of the MT industry
are (i) the forming machines (such as presses, sheet metal deformation machines, shearing
machines), the (ii) cutting machines (such as machining centers, turning machines-lathes,
grinding machines) and the (iii) non conventional machines (such as machines for marking
and cutting with laser); other types of machines are marginal and can be grouped in a
residual class of other machines (which comprehends mechanical arms, measuring-control
machines, and heat treatment machines). As Rolfo (1998) underlines the industry is
characterized by a low rate of product diversication, where the vast majority of rms
have not expanded their traditional production to other types of machines as time has
passed:: instead, they have focused on shaping the machine characteristics to the consumer
needs. Almost all types of products are characterized by the existence of niches in which
the ability to solve customers' specic problem is fundamental. The role of customization
has especially been important for small enterprises, which have developed a particular
ability in interpreting and matching the customer demand (Wengel and Shapira, 2004).
The industry is also characterized by relatively low barriers to entry, because new rms
can be set up with relatively small capital and little technological know-how.
Taking an aggregate perspective, the MT industry is very representative of Italian
competitiveness in the broader mechanical engineering sector (Rolfo and Calabrese, 2006):
in 2007, Italy was in the third place for export value and fourth for value of production,
making it one of the world leaders for production of MT4. Table 1 provides an overview
of the value of production trends since 1998, and Table 2 provides country rankings for
exports value: after Japan, Germany and (more recently) China, Italy is among the
3See Horta csu and Syverson (2009) and Federico (2010) among others.
4For a detailed report on the evolution of the industry in terms of value of production, exports and
imports see the industry reports by Ucimu (2007a,b).
4leaders.
Table 1: Value of Production by country - Trend
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Japan 8018 7074 9564 8470 5712 6189 7504 9382 9634 9406
Germany 6822 7167 7559 8640 7427 6818 7206 7876 8075 9282
China 1690 1747 2445 2928 2487 2635 3280 4100 5653 7360
Italy 3258 3519 4163 4240 4007 3678 3735 3912 4554 5330
South Korea 436 808 1851 1521 1653 1792 1985 2320 3300 3319
Taiwan 1419 1432 2056 1825 1879 1874 2321 2737 3058 3193
U.S. 4216 3980 4534 3670 2570 2129 2554 2788 2937 2610
Switzerland 1753 1905 1965 2319 1930 1664 1878 2120 2363 2543
Spain 844 910 929 990 915 820 822 904 979 1048
France 703 363 517 500 405 418 574 692 762 845
Source: Ucimu,Industry Report, 2007; Millions of euro











Source: Ucimu,Industry Report, 2007; Millions of euro
The Italian MT industry is characterized by the coexistence of a small group of large
rms, which are able to compete both in domestic and in foreign markets, and a large
tier of smaller rms, ranging from highly specialized machine (or components) makers to
rms that provide buer capacity and help larger rms to level out their plant utilization
(see Rolfo, 1998). According to a survey conducted by Ucimu (the Italian Machine Tools,
Robots and Automation Manufacturers Association) in 2006, 71% of MT manufacturers
invoiced less than e12.5 millions, and 75.8% had less than 100 employees. On the other
hand, rms with more than 100 employees produced 67.8% of the overall value of pro-
duction and accounted for 69.7% of the overall exports value. Moreover, turnover per
employee ranged from e127,000 for smaller rms, to e143,300 for larger companies. Le
largest percentage of MT facilities is in the North of Italy, also because the majority of
5clients is located there: Lombardy (the region of Milan) accounts for 46% of the pro-
duction units. The explanation for the existence of a large bunch of small rms has to
be searched, among the other things, in the Italian regulatory environment, which has
made easier for small rms to reduce employment and report scal accounts, thus confer-
ring to these rms an innate exibility advantage, which however has decreased with the
raise of international competition and the introduction of several technological innova-
tions (as exible automation) that have counterbalanced the advantage of smaller rms.
Despite the high fragmentation among smaller and larger rms and their geographical
agglomeration in just few regions, the structure of Italy's MT industry has experienced a
transformation from the typical `industrial district' to networks of rms where the physical
proximity is not essential anymore and the leader of the network is the main actor (both
in terms of exchange of resources and in developing new technologies, as documented by
Wengel and Shapira, 2004).
The vertical structure of the Italian MT industry took dierent congurations since the
1950s (see Rolfo, 1998, 2000). At that time the most important mechanical engineering
rms produced their own MT in-house (from foundry to nished products) thus the
prevailing model was that of vertically integrated rms. The 1960s saw, a signicant
increase in internal demand which stimulated the growth of an independent MT industry
and the 1970s were characterized by the `small rm model', and a consequent vertical
dis-integration of rms: electronic and computer components tended to be outsourced.
Although there have been slight changes over time, this low level of vertical integration
has tended to dominate for the majority of Italian MT rms5. Presently, MT builders
basically `leave to the outside' the manufacture of some components (as electronics), but
there is not a clear path between rm size and vertical integration strategy as it has been
documented by Wengel and Shapira (2004) in a small but signicant sample of around
200 rms: on the one hand small rms show an higher frequency of in-house mechanical
components production, while on the other hand larger rms are more oriented to keep
in-house the electronic assembling and the software planning. Overall, almost all rms
undertake designing, mechanical assembling and testing in-house, which appear as the core
competences. Again, this general evidence conrms the tendency of the Italian machine
tool rms in producing customer-specic interfaces.
The vertical position of the rm along the production chain, therefore, is a key dimen-
sion in this industry, which has consequences both for rms' productive eciency, and
also for the control of the knowledge and innovation processes (Poledrini, 2008).
5Italian manufacturing rms have traditionally showed lower levels of vertical integration than their
counterparts in other European countries e.g. Germany and the UK (see Arrighetti, 1999).
63 The theoretical framework: rm eciency and ver-
tical organization
The model which follows is mainly inspired by the works of Antras and Helpman (2004)
and Syverson (2004).
Preferences and demand The industry under analysis is modeled as a continuum of
nal good producers of measure N. Each producer makes a distinct variety (indexed by
i) of the industry's products-machines. Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the rep-
resentative consumer has preferences over these varieties given by the following quadratic
utility function:




















where q0 is the quantity of a numeraire good, qi is the quantity of good i consumed and
Q =
R
i qidi is the total consumption over all varieties.  and  are the indicators of
the substitution patterns between the dierentiated varieties and the numeraire, while 
index the product dierentiation between the varieties. If  = 0 only the consumption
level over all the varieties matter, because varieties are perfect substitutes.
The inverse demand function for each variety is thus:
pi =    qi   Q: (2)














where N is the measure of producers, pi is the price of good i and  p is the average price
among industry producers. The price bound, pmax
i , at which the demand for variety i







The price bound results to be an increasing function of the  parameter (a higher product
dierentiation leads to an higher upper bound in terms of feasible price for variety i), a
decreasing function of the measure of consumed varieties N, and an increasing function
of the average price of the varieties  p.
7Production and rm behaviour Each variety of machines needs two inputs to be
produced. Capital, Ki , which is available to the machine-tool maker internally and which
has a unit cost equal to wK and an intermediate input, Mi, which can be either produced
by the machine tool maker or acquired from the outside. In the rst case, the intermediate
input has a unit cost equal to wMv (where v stands for for vertical integration) and the
producer is vertically integrated, while in the second case, the price of the intermediate
input is equal to wMo (where o stands for rms engaging in the outsourcing strategy or
simply disintegrated rms) and the producer is disintegrated.
 Assumption 1: wMv < wMo
This assumption does not seem to be restrictive, given that the internally produced input
is evaluated at its marginal cost, while if it is acquired in the market and this is not
perfectly competitive, that can bring to a price which is higher than the marginal cost
(due to double marginalization). Moreover, this is a pretty realistic assumption for the
Italian MT industry: in fact, due to the highly dierentiated nature of nal products, the
market of components is in turn dierentiated.
On the other hand, a vertically integrated rms face higher organizational xed costs:
 Assumption 2: fv > fo
This assumption, which relates to the additional managerial tasks which are needed in
order to supervise the production of the intermediate input is in line with the theoretical
literature on productivity heterogeneity and dierent organizational forms (Antras and
Helpman, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). Moreover, given the complexity of some
phases of the production of a machine tool, as it has been explained in Section 2, it is
reasonable to think that an expansion along the vertical production chain would imply
higher organizational costs.
Production of each variety i is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas function, which is charac-











where 0 <  < 1, and U is a rm-specic random term which is extracted from a
known nonnegative distribution (G(U), U > 0). U reects the rm-specic level of
technical ineciency, i.e. a factor which shifts the rm away from the technology frontier
(production function). In this framework, the production function or technological frontier
is reached by the most ecient rms only, i.e. those with U = 0, while all the other rms
6The main result of the theoretical analysis do not change if there are more than one inputs available
internally to the rm, or the technology is characterized by non-constant returns to scale.
8are below it. We derive the total and the marginal cost function of the rm producing
qi, given the vector of input prices. In equilibrium, the optimal level of inputs solves the



































































which can be substituted in the production function, in order to obtain the conditional
















Now, we can substitute the conditional demand of M
i into Equation 5 in order to obtain

















7As can been easily veried @M
i =@U > 0, i.e. an increase in the use of the input is positively
related to an increase in technical ineciency , given the level of qi; moreover, @M
i =@wK > 0 and
@M
i =@wMl < 0 indicate the substitution between inputs.
8The same considerations on technical ineciency and the relative price apply to this input too.
















































The marginal cost is idiosyncratic to each MT producer, and it is a function of the
technical ineciency term and the relative price. In particular from Equation 9 it follows
that, ceteris paribus:
 @cil=@U > 0, rms which present higher level of ineciency show higher marginal
costs;
















 (pi   cil)   fl; (10)
where fl are the organizational xed costs, which are dierent between vertical integrated
and disintegrated rms.
Equilibrium The MT industry is modeled as a Bertrand-Nash model with dierentiated
products (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, p.395-400): this seems reasonable,
given the industry characteristics which have been introduced in Section 2. Each producer
sells its product on the market at the price which maximizes its prots (see Syverson, 2004,


































which can be substituted into Equation 3, in order to obtain the quantity sold by the























































 p   cil
2
  fl: (15)
A sunk cost needs to be paid before entering in the market, fE
9. After doing that,
the producer can observe its actual ineciency level, U, which determines a rm-specic
marginal cost; thus, rms choose either to start the production, earning the corresponding
prots or to exit the market. In the rst case they can also face the decision on how to
organize the production, i.e. to be vertically integrated or not. In the other case, the
marginal cost results to be above a given threshold and that is due to an ineciency
shock above a given upper bound. In order to assess the existence of rms with dierent
levels in ineciency and dierent organizational form in equilibrium, we need to study
the maximized prot function in relationship with the ineciency term U.


































First, it is possible to verify that the maximized prot function is decreasing in U; in























































Given that the rst two terms are always positive, the third one needs to be positive
for all the rms operating in the industry, and the last one (equal to the marginal cost)
is always positive, the multiplicative constant (-1) makes prots in Equation 17 to be a
negative function of ineciency
From Equation 16 it is possible to see that there is an upper-bound level of ineciency
at which prots go to zero, and rms do not have any incentive to produce in the market.
9Which of course do not appear in Equation 15 of the operating prots.
































































































@fl < 0, and
 @U
@wMl < 0.
Thus, all else equal, higher xed organizational costs and variable costs result in lower
U, which is the highest level of ineciency that rms in the market can bear in order to
have non-negative operating prots.
In equilibrium, the free entry condition pins down the value of U: in fact, it must set












 G(U)dU   fE = 0; (18)
this condition ensures that all producers make non-negative prots and that entry occurs
until the net expected value of taking an inecient draw is 0. When model's parameters
change (;;;fl;wMl), U changes to maintain the equilibrium.
Conditional to the entry equilibrium, vertically integrated rms will face a dierent
upper bound of ineciency from that experienced by disintegrated rms. For purpose
12of simplicity, let us assume  = 1=2 and compute the two upper bounds. Vertically

























It is interesting to derive the conditions under which Uo is higher, equal or lower than
Uv in terms of xed and variable costs. In this way it is possible to infer how rms with
dierent levels of ineciency select dierent vertical organizational congurations.














































The last equation states that if the ratio of xed costs is higher than the ratio of variable
costs, the upper bound of the ineciency level which can be borne by a vertical integrated
rm is lower than the one borne by a disintegrated rm. Moreover, from Equation 17 it is
easy to see that vertical integrated rms will have a prot function with a lower (negative)
slope, due to the fact that wMv < wMo (Assumption 1). We can represent this situation in
Figure 2. In this case, more ecient rms will choose to produce with a vertical integrated
structure because of the higher attainable prots, while less ecient rms will produce
with a disintegrated structure, engaging in the outsourcing of the intermediate input.
Moreover, a lower Uv implies a lower average ineciency level for vertically integrated
rms and a smaller variation of ineciency (variance) among vertical integrated producers
with respect to disintegrated producers.
13Figure 1: Higher bound of ineciency for disintegrated rms
Case 2 - Uo < Uv. If the dierence between the organizational costs are negligible,
while the dierence in variable costs are still signicant, all the rms would choose to
produce as vertically integrated, given that it ensures higher prots than those endured
to disintegrated structure, for each maximum ineciency level. Figure 2 claries this
situation. The rst case seems more appropriate for the industry under analysis: as we
have claried above, xed costs of a vertical integrated rm are not negligible, and the
observation of a dispersion of vertical integration choices among the Italian MT producers
is also supported by the descriptive analysis of data, as showed in Section 5.2. Thus, we
can formulate the following
Testable hypothesis: Vertically integrated rms are expected to show lower levels
of ineciency and to be located nearer to a common production frontier, with respect to
disintegrated rms. The distribution of ineciency for the vertically integrated rms will
have a smaller variance with respect to the ineciency distribution of the disintegrated
rms.
14Figure 2: Similar bounds of ineciency among rms
4 The empirical strategy
We implement a stochastic production frontier model in order to investigate the relation-
ship between rm eciency and the choices regarding the vertical organization. This is
an econometric model which estimates the best-practice production frontier, accounting
for random factors not related to technical ineciency, but which nonetheless aect the
productive performance of the rm10. The stochastic frontier framework seems appropri-
ate in our case, not only because is allows a direct estimation of the ineciency level of
each production unit, but also because it permits to conduct a one-step estimation of the
parameters of the production function and of the coecient of third variables related to
ineciency. This can be considered as an econometric advantage, which avoids more tra-
ditional two-step procedures in which a measure of performance obtained in the rst step
of the analysis (usually total factor productivity) is regressed on a set of covariates in the
second step, likely generating problems of omitted variable bias and under-dispersion of
the productive eciency scores in the rst step (see Wang and Schmidt, 2002, for detailed
Monte Carlo evidence on this issue).
10Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) proposed the stochastic
frontier model, starting from the idea that deviations from the production frontier might not be fully
under the rm's control.
154.1 The stochastic frontier model
We start from the following stochastic production frontier model for panel data:
Yit = f (Xit;)  e
it; (21)
where Yit denotes production of the ith rm in the tth time period , Xit is the vector
of N inputs used by the producer,  is the vector of technology parameters, and it the
composed error term. In the log-linear form, the stochastic frontier model can be rewritten
as
yit = f (xit;) + it; (22)
where
it = vit   uit: (23)
Equations 22 and 23 combine to give
yit = f (xit;) + vit   uit: (24)
The composed error consists of a component uit which accounts for the dierence of the
actual level of production from the maximum attainable level, i.e. technical ineciency,
and a white noise component vit, which accounts for random variations of the frontier
across rms and measurement errors in yit. The uit component is assumed to follow an
exponential distribution and the vit component is assumed to be normally distributed;
also, it is assumed that vit and uit are distributed independent of each other. Several
distributions have been proposed in the relevant literature to model ineciency: the
half-normal, the exponential and the truncated normal are the three most widely used
distributions both for tractability of the composed error term, and for the economic
interpretation (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p.74). The choice of an exponential
distribution to model ineciency is motivated, in our case, by three main reasons: rst,
it is a single-parameter distribution, thus easier to be estimated with comparison to more
computationally burdensome distributions (like the gamma or the truncated normal)11;
second, the single-parameter nature of the distribution implies that the variance and
the mean of the ineciency term vary in the same directions (i.e. a shrinkage in the
variance corresponds to a reduction in the mean of the uit distribution and vice versa): this
perfectly adapts to the testable hypothesis we have advanced at the end of the theoretical
Section 3; nally, the exponential distribution leads to a stochastic frontier model with
11Ritter and Simar (1997) propose a rather skeptical view on the use of the gamma and the truncated
normal distribution in order to model the ineciency term, because of problems in estimating the extra-
parameter of the two distributions; Koop (2001) argues that the exponential distribution is able to capture
a wide variety of ineciency behaviour.
16the scaling property, and this property is particularly useful when the ineciency term,
uit, is assumed to be a function of a set of rm-related variables as in our case:
uit (zit;)  0; (25)
where zit is a vector of the characteristics of the MT producers, including a measure
of vertical integration and a set of control variables, and  is a vector of parameters to
be estimated indicating the relationship between these variables and uit. The scaling
property implies that changes in the values of the variables aecting ineciency (zit),
aect the scale but not the shape of the distribution of uit (Wang and Schmidt, 2002;
Alvarez, Amsler, Orea, and Schmidt, 2006). Formally,
uit (zit;) = h(zit;)  uit; (26)
where h(zit;)  0 is the scaling function and uit is the basic distribution that does not
depend on the zit vector12. The scaling property seems appealing in our context, because
it allows to consider the eect of random rm characteristics, such as natural management
skills (described by a basic random variable u) as distinct from the result of other rm
characteristics (i.e. vertical integration) and the environmental `constraints' under which
it operates (for example some characteristics of the industry).
Dierent models have been proposed to take account of the eects of `third variables'
zit
13. One method is to directly specify the distribution parameters of uit as functions of
the rm-related variables, and then to estimate all the parameters in the model (technol-
ogy parameters of the frontier function plus all parameters of the ineciency equation)
via maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. In this paper, we hypothesize that the variance
of uit depends on the rm-specic degree of vertical integration and a set of rm controls
and the variance of vit (noise) is a function of rm size14.





uit  Exp(it); (28)
where it is the scale parameter of the exponential distribution, and

2
it = g(z2) (29)
12It is easy to see that the exponential distribution enjoys this property, because an exponential
distribution uit  Exp(it (zit;)), is equivalent to an exponential distribution uit  Exp(1) times the
parameter it.
13See Huang and Liu (1994); Battese and Coelli (1995); Caudill, Ford, and Gropper (1995); Wang
(2003) among others.




vit = f(z1); (30)
where z2 includes the measures of rm vertical integration as well as several controls and
z1 is a measure of rm size, while  and  are vectors of the parameters to be estimated.
We have chosen to implement a double heteroskedastic frontier model not only because,
as it has been said above, it is a way of looking at the relationship of ineciency with a
set of covariates of interest, but also because neglected heteroskedasticity in the two error
components can bring to serious biases both in the technology parameters estimates and
in the ineciency estimates: in particular, as Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) have noticed,
(i) unmodeled heteroskedasticity in vit leads to bias in the technical ineciency estimates,
while (ii) unmodeled heteroskedasticity in uit causes bias in both the production frontier
parameters and the technical ineciency estimates15.
Conditional on zit, uit is assumed to be independent across i and t (uits are indepen-
dent across individuals and over time)16. With the above distributional assumptions on
uit and vit, it is possible to write the density function of the composed error term f(it)
as a generalization of the normal-exponential model presented by Meeusen and van den
























where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, it is the standard
deviation of the ineciency component, vit the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
part and it = yit  xit
0, is the vector of overall errors. Thus, the log-likelihood function





















































it = f(z1) + g(z2); (33)
15The issue of heteroskedasticity has captured the attention of several scholars in the eld: see Reif-
schneider and Stevenson (1991), Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill, Ford, and Gropper (1995), Hadri,
Guermat, and Whittaker (2003)
16Note that ML estimates based on the assumption of independent observation are consistent even if
observations are not independent; the requirement is the correct specication of the marginal distribution









Equation 32 can be maximized to obtain estimates of ,  and ; the estimates of  and
 in turn can be used to obtain estimates of it and vit.
4.2 Model specication
In order to estimate the stochastic frontier model parameters via ML, we have to assume
specic functional forms for Equations 24, 29 and 30. We adopt a translog specication
for the production function with three inputs17:
yit = 0 +
X
n







np  (xnitxpit) + t + j + vit   uit; (35)
where n;p=(capital, labour, intermediates). In order to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity among rms producing dierent typologies of machines, we include (j   1)
dummies j in the frontier, where j = (1;:::;9) refers to the type of machine produced
by the rm; we control also for factors aecting all rms in the same way in a given year
including (t 1) year dummies t
18. It is also necessary to assume some specic functional
forms for (29) and (30): following Hadri (1999), we employ an exponential function to
model variances of the error components, in particular:

2
it = exp(z2) = exp(0 + 1V DIS + 2SIZE+
3DOWNER + 4DDIST + 5DCY CLE); (36)
where z2 denotes the degree of rm vertical (dis)integration, and includes controls for rm
size, ownership type, agglomeration economies and the economic cycle (the explanation
on how these variables have been measured is given in Section 5.1) and

2
vit = exp(z1) = exp(0 + 1SIZE); (37)
where z1 is a measure of rm size. ML estimation is implemented in order to obtain
consistent and ecient estimates of the parameters in equations 35, 36 and 37, i.e. b , b ,
b , b  and b .
17The functional form adopted in the empirical analysis is a generalization of the simple Cobb-Douglas
employed in the theoretical model. However, the basic prediction of the theoretical model does not depend
on the specic functional form, while a more exible function permits a better adaptation to the data.
18The inclusion of `eects' in the stochastic frontier allows us to dierentiate between unobserved
heterogeneity and time-variant ineciency.
195 Data and descriptive analysis
We exploit an original database which has been compiled recovering data from several
data sources. The list of MT producers is from Ucimu and includes information on
rm's type production19. Information on output and inputs is from Bureau Van Dijk's
AIDA database, which contains balance sheet information for rms with turnovers over
e500,000. Information on the ownership status is from the Bureau Van Dijk's Ownership
Database, and information on district location was obtained by comparing the locations
of local rm units | contained in AIDA| with the list of Italian Labor Local Systems
(LLS) regularly updated by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, ISTAT 20. Deators
for output, intermediate inputs and capital stock respectively, were computed from the
Value of Production and Investments series published by Istat annually at the sectoral
level (2-digit level) 21.
5.1 Description of the variables
Variables in the production frontier
The output (Y ) is measured by the amount of revenues from sales and services at the
end of the year, net of inventory changes and changes to contract work in progress. This
measure is deated in order to account for price variations during a year. The deator
was built at the 2-digit level (Ateco 2007 classication) and is equal to the ratio of the
value of production at current prices, in a given year, over the corresponding value in the
chained level series22. The measure is expressed in e'000.
The labour input (L) is measured as the total number of employees at the end of the
year. Capital stock (K) in a given year is proxied by the nominal value of tangible xed
assets, which is deated using the ratio of gross xed investments at current prices over
corresponding values in the chained level series. Given the unavailability of series at the
2-digit level, we use a common deator for all rms (investments for aggregate C-D-E
Ateco 2007 Industry sectors). The measure is expressed in e'000. Intermediate inputs
(M) are measured as the sum of (i) costs of raw, materials consumed and goods for resale
(net of changes in inventories) plus (ii) costs of services. The measure is deated by the
same deator applied to output. It is expressed in e'000.
All inputs and the output have been normalized by mean-correction before including
them in logs in the production frontier. In this way coecients of the translog production
19Note that the list does not include only Ucimu associates, it includes all rms covered by surveys
and research questionnaires administered by the Association. There are almost 550 rms on this list.
20http://www.istat.it.
21http://www.istat.it/conti/nazionali/.
22The base year for the chained series is 2000.
20function can be interpreted as output elasticities with respect to inputs for the average
unit considered.
Vertical (dis)integration
We use a measure of vertical disintegration, (V DIS), and we build it as the ratio of
intermediate inputs (M) over total costs of production for the year. For the ith rm in
the tth time period, this can be written as:
V DISit =
CRM;it + CS;it
CRM;it + CS;it + CL;it + CK;it + CO;it
(38)
where CRM;it is the cost of raw, materials consumption and goods for resale (net of changes
in inventories), CS;it is the cost of services, CL;it is total personnel costs, CK;it is total
depreciation, amortization and write downs (thus it can be interpreted as the gurative
cost of capital) and CO;it is a residual class, which is a negligible portion of the total costs
of production and can be considered equal to zero for the purpose of the present analysis.
This ratio is an indicator of the relative `weight' of the factors of production external to
the rm (i.e. acquired from other rms), over all factors of production including labour
and capital23. This measure is related to that proposed by Adelman (1955), i.e. the ratio
of value added to sales as a measure of vertical integration, however, we think about our
measure as an improvement with respect to the Adelman index for several reasons.
Adelman's index has been criticized mostly for the problems involved in applying it
in cross-industry studies24 and its asymmetry25. However, our measure should not suer
the same problems in the case under analysis. First, the Italian MT industry is a quite
narrowly dened industry so there should be no cross-industry problems. Second, even if
the major drawback is that we do not have information on prices, and we cannot control
explicitly for the likely dierent unitary costs which may be faced by dierent rms in the
sample, it is relevant to note that as for labour, given the well known salary `rigidities'
in the Italian labour market, it is not restrictive to assume wit = wjt for all rms i 6= j.
For capital, it is reasonable to assume that the dierences aecting variations in CK;it
23A value of 1, means that the rm depends on external suppliers for almost all of its production
inputs; values near 0 indicate that the rm bases its production on its own capital and labour, i.e. it is
vertically integrated.
24The empirical literature on vertical integration has made some proposals to overcome these draw-
backs, such as the use of other measures. See, e.g. the use of input/output tables proposed by Maddigan
(1981) to build a `vertical industry connection index' for all industries in which the rm operates, which
was adapted by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) to evaluate the determinants of vertical integra-
tion in a cross-country perspective.
25Holding the ratio(VA/Sales) constant, rms near the end of the production chain (and nal con-
sumers) appear less integrated (Davies and Morris, 1995).
21among rms, depend on the amount of machines and equipment acquired26. Finally, our
measure is not sensitive to dierences in the output price, which could simply result from
dierent qualities in the output sold by the rm or dierent degrees of market power:
these dierences enter in the denominator of the Adelman index, but not in our measure
of vertical disintegration. For these reasons, the measure we use appears to be the best
available solution to capture the rm vertical organization given the available data, and
in this context is preferred to Adelman's index. Nonetheless, we use the Adelman index
as robustness check in the econometric analysis.
Control variables
In line with previous studies, we included a set of control variables in the vector z2 in
order to minimize the danger of capturing misleading spurious correlation between vertical
disintegration and ineciency.
We include a measure of rm size, (SIZE), which is dened as total number of employ-
ees at the end of the year. The relationship between size and eciency has been debated
in the empirical literature27, but is still not clearcut: see Caves and Barton (1990) for an
investigation of US manufacturing; Gumbau and Maudos (2002), Taymaz (2005), Diaz
and Sanchez (2008) for empirical investigations on Spanish and Turkish manufacturing;
Badunenko, Fritsch, and Stephan (2008) for the relationship in German manufacturing.
The contradictory results from these studies are an indication that single-industry studies
are required in order to monitor the relationship between size and eciency. Thus it is rel-
evant to control for it, especially because it may be correlated with other non{observable
rm characteristics such as degree of internationalization and quality of inputs, especially
managerial sta.
Even if in the last years the geographical distribution of MT producers does not
correspond to the typical industrial district, we include a control for rms localized in
industrial districts, in order to take account of this kind of agglomeration economies:
DDIST is a time-invariant dummy variable that takes the value `1' if rms have at
least one local unit (either headquarters or not) located in a mechanical engineering
industrial district and `0' otherwise. It is well known that industrial districts are key socio-
economic structures in the Italian industrial system (Becattini, 1990). Fabiani, Pellegrini,
Romagnano, and Signorini (1998) found a positive relationship between eciency and
district location, in a sample of Italian manufacturing rms in the period 1982 to 1995, and
Becchetti, Panizza, and Oropallo (2008) shows that industrial district rms demonstrate
26In fact, year quota of depreciations and amortizations are computed following scal deductibility
purposes, using the coecients established by the Ministry of Economy and Finance at sectoral level |
and thus are common to all rms belonging to the same sector| in the Ministerial Decree 31.12.1988.
27The theme has also been deeply studied in the empirical literature regarding agricultural production.
22higher value added per employee and higher export intensity.
In the Italian MT industry, dierent decades are characterized by dierent ownership
forms. The 1980s were characterized by a structural strengthening of the industry via
external growth (Rolfo, 1993). This tendency slowed down in the rst half of the 1990s,
but was reinvigorated at the end of that decade, as MT builders tried to maintain control
of the production process. During the second half of the 1990s, the mechanical engineering
sector experienced a new wave of mergers (Rolfo, 1998), designed to cope better with risk
and to exploit market and production complementarities. Thus the ownership structure
is relevant for an analysis of rm eciency: rst, because it can be a substitute for
vertical integration, and second, in line with Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004), because
rm eciency is heavily driven by managerial eort, and seriously aected by conicts
between ownership (shareholders) and control (management) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
To control for type of ownership we included a dummy variable DOWNER) that takes
the value `1' if the rm belongs to an industrial group (either national or international)and
`0' if the rm is independent: rms are considered as part of a group if they control or
are controlled by other rms with a percentage of shares  50%28.
Finally we include a dummy, DCY CLE, for the years showing a downward trend in
the value of production , i.e. 2002, 2003 and 2004. Given the cyclical nature of the MT
industry, failing to control for the cycle could bias our results on the relationship between
vertical disintegration and ineciency. Moreover, the dummy variable allows us to look
at the eect of the economic cycle on rm eciency.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Based on the reference list provided by Ucimu, we collected balance sheet data for 524
rms and 5,240 observations from Bureau Van Dijk's AIDA database. We discarded some
observations after a preliminary analysis which revealed missing values and outliers. First,
we excluded observations with missing values for output, inputs and the variables in the
ineciency model. The number of not usable observations is 1,467 (mostly due to the
unavailability on the number of employees). Moreover, we excluded eleven observations
because they presented negative values for output or inputs. In order to detect some
possible outliers, we conducted an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the translog
production function, and found that the residuals-versus-tted plot revealed ve more
observations which have not been included in the frontier analysis, due to their exceptional
28This may be a restrictive threshold. Control over other rms may be possible even at much lower
shares; also, in the Italian MT industry there are informal groups which are linked not just by ownership
of relevant shares quotas, but by familial links. However, this conservative measure of ownership control
ensures a clear distinction between rms belonging to established groups and other rms (independent,
or part of an informal group).
23distance from the cloud of observations, i.e. observations with standardized residuals
> j5j). These preliminaries reduced our nal sample to an unbalanced panel amounting
to 505 rms and 3,757 usable observations, for the period 1998 to 2007.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample under analysis and Table 4
presents a breakdown of the obervations with respect to the production of the rm (i.e.
the type of machine produced): the two largest product specializations are metal cutting
machines (e.g. machining centers, lathes) and metal forming machines (presses, sheet
metal deformation machines).
Overall, our sample depicts gures which are in line with general statistics on the
industry that can be found in technical reports, as the one provided by UCIMU (Ucimu,
2007a). Almost 75% of machine producers in our sample invoice around e13.0 millions,
while the top 10% of rms invoices (at least) more than two times of that amount: this
claims for an high fragmentation among smaller and larger rms in terms of market shares,
as already underlined in Section 2. If we compare the evidence contained in the technical
report with our data (Table 5) our sample slightly over-represents medium rms and
under-represents small rms (in terms of employees). This is basically conrmed when
we look at the geographical distribution of the rms: it is well known that producers
of machine tools in Emilia-Romagna are usually smaller than their counterparts located
in Piemonte and Lombardia: that is why the sample under-represents the percentage
of rms located in Emilia-Romagna and sightly over-represent the percentage of rms
located in the other two regions. The descriptive evidence is also in line with previous
studies on the industry. Firms in our sample show high levels of vertical disintegrations
(.67) on average, and this is in line with previous results, e.g. Arrighetti (1999) who
provides an analysis of vertical integration among Italian manufacturing rms using the
Adelman index, and shows an average degree of vertical integration of .35 for mechanical
engineering rms . If we look at the distribution of levels of vertical (dis)integration
in Figure 3 and we focus on its evolution from 1998 to 2007, for those rms which are
observable in both years, two facts are evident: rst the high heterogeneity in the vertical
organization of MT producers which is stable as time has passed; second, the agreement
with a general tendency toward a disintegration of production (outsourcing) in the past
years, which occurred also in this industry. In fact, in the 2007 kernel density an higher
number of observations are clustered around the .75 peak of the V DIS distribution.
The range of values is wide, showing the coexistence of vertically integrated rms with
rms relying on external phases of productions (via acquired intermediate inputs). Rolfo
(1998) underlines that from 1995 onwards, rms tried to strengthen their control over
suppliers via external growth and the establishment of small industrial groups. In our
sample almost 24% of rms belong to an industrial group (either a subsidiary or the
holding company). Moreover, in our sample only a small proportion of rms (around 6%)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 4: Breakdown of rms by the type of production
Product categories N rms N obs
Builders of metal cutting machines 175 1290
Builders of metal forming machines 124 898
Builders of unconventional machines 24 176
Builders of welding machines 2 13
Builders of measuring-control machines 15 111
Builders of heat treatment machines 19 141
Builders of mechanical devices 107 826
Builders of electric/electronic equipment 22 175
Builders of tools 17 127
Total 505 3757
Table 5: Sample vs. Ucimu industry report
Ucimu - industry report (2006) Sample (2006)
% on total number of rms % on total number of rms
Size classes  50 63.10 57.11
50:100 14.80 21.45
>100 22.10 21.45




Other regions 7.40 7.88
*Triveneto=Veneto+Friuli+Trentino Alto-Adige
26Figure 3:
to above. Given these preliminary evidences we are pretty condent that our sample
describes the industry under analysis in a fair way (maybe a little bit biased toward
medium-sized rms), capturing a large set of relevant characteristics of it.
6 Econometric analysis
6.1 Baseline results
Our estimations are based on Stata 10.1 software29. In order to analyze the relationship
between rm eciency ant the vertical organization, we have run three specications of
the model. Below we describe the groupings; this makes the results easier to understand,
and introduces the various statistical tests. All specications (except M1, which has been
estimated via OLS) are estimated via the ML method, which jointly estimates the frontier
parameters in Equation 35, and the coecients of variables in the models of variances in
Equation 36 and 37. Table 6 presents the estimates for the frontier parameters and Table
7 presents the vector of coecient estimates in Equations 36 and 37.
29The estimation of the parameters of the stochastic frontier model has been performed using the
frontier command.
27Table 6: Frontier parameters estimation
Specication M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Variable Coecient
lnK k 0.0249*** 0.0266*** 0.0263*** 0.0261*** 0.0267***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028)
lnL l 0.2141*** 0.2208*** 0.2129*** 0.2157*** 0.2102***
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0055)
lnM l 0.7670*** 0.7585*** 0.7665*** 0.7681*** 0.7666***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0056)
(.5)(lnK)2 kk 0.0071*** 0.0089*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0087***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
(.5)(lnL)2 ll 0.1263*** 0.1327*** 0.1295*** 0.1278*** 0.1265***
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0051)
(.5)(lnM)2 mm 0.1218*** 0.1268*** 0.1246*** 0.1245*** 0.1238***
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056)
(lnK)(lnL) kl -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0040 -0.0027
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025)
(lnK)(lnM) km -0.0033 -0.0056** -0.0052** -0.0052** -0.0057**
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
(lnL)(lnM) lm -0.1168*** -0.1208*** -0.1187*** -0.1180*** -0.1180***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048)
Constant  0.0073 0.0517*** 0.0529*** 0.0534*** 0.0560***
(0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0077)
Year dummies t Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prod dummies j Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood 2787 2819 2823 2824 2843
Observations 3757 3757 3757 3757 3757
St. err. of coecients in parentheses.
Signicance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,*** 1%.
Year and Prod estimates omitted.
Complete table available from the authors upon request.
28The specications can be grouped as follows:
 M1: OLS average production function estimation, in which 2
it is assumed to be
equal to zero; in other words, this model does not consider the possibility of existence
of ineciency in the sample. All rms are regarded as technical ecient, and all
deviations from the frontier are due to noise.
 M2: Homoskedastic frontier; in this model variance of both error components |vit
and uit| is assumed to be constant among the observations: the assumption can
be formalized as 2
vit = 2
v and 2
it = 2 for all i;t. In the case under analysis, the
preference for this model would imply that MT producers' technical eciency is not
related to their degree of vertical disintegration and to other variables in z2, and
noise is not heteroskedastic in rm size.
Table 7: Models of variance
Specication M2 M3 M4 M5
ln(2) function
VDIS 1 2.0813** 2.0581** 2.6333***
(0.8777) (0.8790) (0.9156)








Constant 0 -6.0947*** -7.5259*** -7.5413*** -7.6254***





Constant 0 -4.5340*** -4.5223*** -4.5236*** -4.4594***
(0.0318) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0379)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prod dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood 2819 2823 2824 2843
Observations 3757 3757 3757 3757
St. err. of coecients in parentheses
Signicance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,*** 1%
Year and Prod estimates omitted.
Complete table available from the authors upon request.
29 M3-M5: Heteroskedastic frontier specications: the measure of vertical disintegra-
tion (V DIS) is introduced alone in specication M3, while a control for rm size
enters in specication M4 and the full vector of controls is included in specication
M5; this last specication should be the one in which spurious correlations between
vertical disintegration and rm ineciency are minimized.
Generalized likelihood ratio tests of the form LR =  2[lnL(H0)   lnL(H1)]  2
J
30 can
be performed on the parameters of the frontier and on the coecients of the ineciency
model in order to select the model that minimizes any misspecication bias. All test results
are reported in Table 8. The translog specication seems an adequate representation of the
technology: in fact, the likelihood ratio test, in the rst row of the Table, strongly rejects
the restrictions imposed by a nested Cobb-Douglas. Frontier models are preferred to the
Table 8: Generalized LR tests on the parameters of stochastic frontier model
Null Hypothesis Conditions 2 statistics Critical values (5%)
Cobb-Douglas restrictions n;p=0, for n;p = K;L;M 785.77 12.59
No ineciency 2
it=0 65.57 2.71*
No time dummies t=0 161.08 16.92
No production dummies j=0 236.13 15.50
Heteroskedastic vs. homoskedastic frontier 0 = SIZE=0 48.33 12.59
No vertical (dis)integration eect V DIS=0 9.48 3.84
No control variables eects controls = SIZE=0 41.81 15.09
*: the test is at the boundary of the parameter space ;
the critical value comes from the table provided by Kodde and Palm (1986)
average production function model. If we take Specication (M2), the homoskedastic
frontier, we can test 2
it > 0 versus the null hypothesis of 2
it = 0: in the case in which
the null hypothesis is accepted, the stochastic frontier model will reduce to an average
production function model with symmetric errors, which could be consistently estimated
by means of OLS. The second row in Table 8 denitely rejects the null hypothesis, thus
conrming the presence of ineciency in the sample and the adequacy of the stochastic
frontier tool. Moving to specication (M5), both time dummies and production dummies
result to be signicant, showing that is relevant to control for the type of production of the
rm and unobserved factors aecting all rms in a given year. Also, the heteroskedastic
frontier specication (M5) is preferred to the homoskedastic frontier (M2): we tested
the joint signicance of all explanatory variables aecting the ineciency variance and
the null hypothesis is rmly rejected. This reassures us about the fact that measured
ineciency is a function of the chosen variables. We have tested also for the signicance
30J is the number of restrictions: see (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, and Battese, 2005, pp.258-259) for a
useful introduction to statistical tests in stochastic frontier analysis.
30of the V DIS variable, with respect to a specication that excludes it. The sixth row
in Table 8 reports the results of this LR test, which show that the vertical organization
of the rm, captured by the variable V DIS is signicant in explaining the ineciency
variance dierences among MT producers. The last row in Table 8 shows the relevance
of the controls.
A negative coecient in Table 7 can be alternatively interpreted as a negative eect
on the variance of ineciency, or a positive relationship with rm eciency. Results in
specication (M5), which is our favorite given its better adaptation to data with respect
to (M1-M4), show that after controlling for rm size, type of ownership, agglomeration
economies and economic cycle, the higher degree of vertical disintegration is signicantly
related to an higher variance (and higher mean) of the ineciency distribution, thus
implying lower ineciency for vertical integrated rms, ceteris paribus. The negative
coecient of V DIS suggests that more integrated organizations are advantaged: rms
that carry out more phases of the production process internally, enjoy advantages over
less integrated producers. The result is conrmed by the signicant negative value of
the coecient of the ownership dummy (DOWNER), in all of the specications M6{M8.
A group structure can substitute for vertical integration in some respects: both internal
and external (through the group) vertical integration have positive eects on eciency.
The positive eect of group structure cancels out any potential negative outcomes of
ownership{manager conicts, such as the ones arising in the analysis conducted by Bot-
tasso and Sembenelli (2004).
Overall, this result is pretty much in line with our theoretical model, predicting verti-
cal integrated rms to be nearer to the technological frontier, with a lower upper bound
level of ineciency, due to higher xed organizational costs. Given that the ineciency
distribution has been assumed as exponential, an lower threshold implies also a smaller
variance of the ineciency distribution, that is in line with what we nd in the empirical
analysis. However, even if the empirical results have captured a systematic pattern be-
tween rm eciency and vertical integration, this result cannot be interpreted as a causal
relationship: in fact, even controlling for a relevant set of rm characteristics and thus
lowering the danger of misleading spurious correlations, we cannot control explicitly in
this econometric framework for the reverse causality, i.e. the eect that goes from the ver-
tical structure to rm eciency. In the theoretical model, we have in mind a self-selection
process of the most ecient rms to vertical integrated structures, but we cannot exclude
that the regressions are capturing also a reinforcing phenomenon which runs in the op-
posite direction (a sort of learning channel): this could be explained by dierent factors,
such as a greater coordination in production processes or a better adaptation (in terms
of quality and quantity) of intermediate inputs to the nal output which can be achieved
by a rm which becomes vertical integrated.
The value of other parameters is worthy of comment. It should be noted that the
31measure of rm size is positively correlated with the ineciency variance: this contrasts
the commonly held view that a larger size can be used as a proxy for a better organization.
However, it has been largely shown that the relationship between size and ineciency is
basically industry-specic: in our case it is relevant to control for it, as the signicant
coecient demonstrates, in order to minimize dangers of spurious correlations31. A second
robust result in the heteroskedastic frontier specication (M5), is the signicant negative
coecient of the dummy for downward cycle: when the aggregate demand is low, the
variance of ineciency decreases. Taken together with the rst result this means that
down phases result in partial loss of the eciency advantages from vertical integration
and could suggest a sort of dynamic advantage among less integrated rms. Finally, the
dummy for those rms localized in an industrial district shows a negative coecient:
agglomeration economies seem to enhance the productive performance of rms in the
Italian MT industry, showing a lower variance of the ineciency distribution for rms
localized in an mechanics industrial district.
It is possible to compute the rm and year-specic ineciency scores via the following
formula, which is an extension of the one proposed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and
Schmidt (1982) when uit and vit are heteroskedastic:
























Figure 4 shows kernel densities of the eciency scores from 1998 to 2007. It is possible
to appreciate that in the year of downward aggregate demand, the distribution of the
ineciency scores is more distributed around its central tendency, thus showing a lower
variance, as the coecient of the dummy DCY CLE showed in Table 7.
6.2 Robustness checks
In the present Section we perform two types of robustness checks. First, we explore
the sensitivity of the main result of our analysis |i.e. that vertically integrated rms
delineate the technology frontier| to changes in the employed measure of vertical in-
tegration; second, we include the one-year lagged estimated variance in the skedastic
Equation 36, in order to see if the variance of the ineciency distribution is basically de-
termined by its lag and just spuriously correlated with the vertical integration degree32.
We do not report the frontier parameter estimates in order to save space, also because
31Firm size is also signicant in explaining dierences in the variance of the noise term, thus it is
necessary to include it in Equation 37.
32We have also run specication (M5) on a sample made up of those rms which produce nal good
(machines) only, and not just components. The main result of the analysis is stable.
32Figure 4:
no signicant changes are observed with respect to specication (M5), and we directly
focus on the variance equations. In the rst column of Table 9, we use the more tradi-
tional Adelman index (V I) as the measure for vertical integration. The index is equal
to the ratio of value added over sales and higher values correspond to higher degrees
of vertical integration: the coecient is negative and signicant showing lower variance
of the ineciency distribution to more vertically integrated rms, thus conrming the
main result in the baseline specication (M5). In the second column of the Table we
have substituted the V DIS measure with its one-year lag and forward moving average,
V DISmov;(i;t) = (V DISi;t 1 + V DISi;t + V DISi;t+1=3); this has been done in order to
minimize undesirable variations in the vertical disintegration measure due to uctuations
in prices or cost shares which do not relate to the vertical structure of the rm, while to
the economic situation in an year. The coecient of the V DISmov variable is pretty much
in line with the estimated coecient in specication (M5), thus reassuring us about the
goodness of the employed measure. In the third column, we include the lagged estimated
variances in the skedastic function of ineciency performing a second round estimation
of specication (M5). Overall, the magnitude of the coecient of V DIS raises with the
inclusion of the lagged variance in Equation 36 and this is also partially due to sample
selection (in fact the number of observations decreases from 3757 to 3031), but the sign
of the relationship remains stable. More disintegrated rms show higher variance (and
33Table 9: Models of variance











SIZE 0.0003 0.0003** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
DOWNER 0.0655 -0.3334* -1.4345***
(0.1750) (0.1951) (0.4319)
DDIST -1.0922*** -1.1660** -2.1315**
(0.4075) (0.4976) (0.9155)
DCYCLE -1.2289*** -1.0680** -1.8391***
(0.2611) (0.4298) (0.6614)




SIZE -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant -4.5223*** -4.4650*** -4.4399***
(0.0306) (0.0374) (0.0376)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Prod dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood 2991 2843 2365
Observations 3757 3757 3031
St. err. of coecients in parentheses
Signicance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,*** 1%
Frontier parameter estimates omitted.
Complete table available from the authors upon request.
mean) of the ineciency distribution, thus positioning further away from the stochastic
production frontier with respect to more integrated ones. Moreover, given the negative
coecient of the lagged variance, it seems that rms with higher variance at time t   1
show a lower variance at time t, as a sort of `converge to the frontier' phenomenon.
7 Concluding remarks and suggested further research
In this paper we have studied the relationship between vertical integration and rm ef-
ciency in the Italian machine tool industry. We have rst set up a theoretical model
(in line with previous models on productivity heterogeneity and organizational choices,
34as the one proposed by Antras and Helpman (2004)), in order to come up with a testable
hypothesis: in our model more ecient rms decide to produce as vertically integrated,
bearing higher (organizational) xed costs while less ecient rms choose to outsource
part of production process buying an intermediate input from other rms, thus reducing
xed costs but bearing higher marginal costs of production. In equilibrium, the two types
of organizations coexist and the industry contemplates rms with dierent levels of e-
ciency. This theoretical result is pretty much in line with the previous quantitative and
qualitative evidence on the industry, as the work by Zanfei and Gambardella (1994) who
claim that in the Italian MT sector rms with dierent size, organization structures and
sourcing strategies coexist, and complement each other in supplying the market all the
varieties requested by a highly dierentiated demand, or Wengel and Shapira (2004) who
points to a dualistic structure of the industry. However, while previous work has stressed
the general characteristic of `size' as point of dierentiation between the groups of rms
in the industry, we think that the vertical structure better represents the dierent choices
for the organization of production.
We empirically ground this result, conducting a stochastic frontier analysis on a sam-
ple of more than 500 machine tool producers. In this way it is possible to estimate the
best practice technology frontier, measuring the distance to it as indicators of ineciency
(sub-optimal level of output, given the amount of inputs and the available technology).
The empirical analysis shows that vertical integrated rms present a lower variance (and
lower mean) of the ineciency distribution, after having controlled for rm size, type of
ownership, agglomeration economies and the economic cycle. Thus, vertical integrated
rms are, ceteris paribus more ecient in the industry under analysis than disintegrated
rms. An important clarication should be stressed: even if our theoretical model pre-
dict a self-selection mechanism of more ecient rms to vertical integrated structures,
the empirical analysis cannot rule out the inverse direction of the relationship. In other
words, there could be a positive eect which goes from vertical integration to rm e-
ciency, which have been supported by previous evidence in the management and industrial
economics literature 33. Thus, any kind of causal eect should be considered with cau-
tion. Nonetheless, the empirical results are a further evidence in line to our theoretical
expectation and they result to be stable to several robustness check.
Overall, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the coexistence of het-
erogeneous rms characterized by dierent levels of eciency and dierent organizational
forms. Focusing on core competences and leaving some phases of the production to the
`outside' |that has been documented as one of the most relevant business practice in the
last decades (see the evidence provided by Feenstra, 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 2005,
33A greater coordination in the production process, a reduction in the transaction costs and the
possibility of an optimal amount of specic investments have been advanced as key factors which may
enhance the performance of a rm which becomes vertical integrated.
35among others)| may be a rational choice for less ecient rms in order to make positive
operating prots and stay in the market. On the other hand, more ecient rms could
exploit their eciency advantage to control a greater part of the production chain in or-
der to benet from greater coordination among dierent phases and tailored intermediate
inputs34. From a methodological point of view, the stochastic frontier framework allows
us to estimate rm ineciency as the distance from the technology frontier (the best
practice) and to jointly estimate the relationship between the degree of vertical integra-
tion and ineciency. This can be considered as an improvement with respect to previous
works on the same topic, which rested on more traditional 2-step procedures which may
lead up to omitted variable bias and under-dispersion of productive eciency scores in
the rst step of the analysis.
Among the lines for future research, we highlight the following issues:
 A qualitative analysis of a small number of rms in the industry could be a natural
complement to this study: the vertical organization heterogeneity that we detected
through our econometric analysis could be grounded in a careful description of the
stages of the production process which are actually kept in-house.
 Some econometric renements may be possible. One of them is related to the
`simultaneity' problem, which, in our case, could stand for a reverse causality, from
vertical integration to rm eciency.
34This could further enhance the eciency advantage of the most integrated rms, but we cannot
asses this directly through our econometric analysis.
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